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7 May 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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REPORT URGES USING DOMESTIC FUELS TO REPLACE OIL

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 7 Apr 82 p 20

[Text] The Energy Ministry is criticized for its unwillingness to support studies of the coal at Nuussuaq.

On 1 April the price of heat, electricity and water rose again. This meant that the cost of keeping the livingroom warm rose 10 percent, lighting the lamps rose 6 percent and a shower or a glass of water rose 22 percent.

The main reason was an increase in the price of oil, according to GTO [Greenland Technical Organization]. As far as heating plants are concerned, the purchase of this black liquid accounts for a good 90 percent of total costs, while the figure for electric plants is 60 percent.

These figures are a very pertinent illustration of why we need to make Greenland less dependent on oil. The question was discussed last week in parliament in connection with a proposal for a new energy plan.

The working group that came up with the plan recommended the use of more waterpower and Greenland coal in order to reduce dependence on the oil sheiks' whims. By the year 2000, three-fourths of the energy in Greenland can be supplied by the country's own resources, it was estimated. But the price would also be high--2.6 billion kroner.

Even so parliament thought it would be sensible to follow the energy plan. With the skyrocketing oil prices, the very large initial investment would be more than repaid in the long run.

But how to provide the money for this has not been decided yet. "The parties involved must discuss that question in greater detail," said member of parliament Lars Emil Johansen in his presentation.

Energy Savings

Spokesmen for both parties--Preben Lange for Siumut [socialist, radical home-rule party] and Peter Ostermann for Atassut [moderate, pro-Denmark party]--supported the introduction of various energy-saving measures, especially

home insulation, and said this should be followed up by an effective energy-conservation campaign.

Lars Emil Johansen announced in this connection that 300,000 kroner had been set aside for this purpose.

Much of the discussion concerned the coal deposits at Nuussuaq which all agreed should be investigated more thoroughly. It is not yet known how much coal is there or what consequences mining would have on the environment and the local inhabitants.

In this context, criticism was expressed that the Energy Ministry was unwilling to grant subsidies for such studies.

"There were no problems in getting money for projects such as Kvanefjeld, Syd-uran or studies concerning a hydroelectric plant in Johan Dahl Land," said Preben Lange. "But that may be because these projects are something that could be used to supply Danish energy needs, whereas apparently the coal would affect Greenland alone," he suggested.

Lars Emil Johansen said the problem had already been brought up with the Joint Council on Mineral Resources. He promised that the criticism would be passed along to the research division of the Energy Ministry.

6578
CSO: 3106/103

ADVANTAGES, LIMITATIONS OF ELECTRIC AUTOMOBILES VIEWED

West Berlin DIW WOCHENBERICHT in German 25 Mar 82 pp 171-176

[Article: "No Saving of Primary Energy With Electric Automobile. On the Question of Using Electrically Operated Automobiles as a Substitute for Petroleum"]

[Text] In talks being held in the FRG about reducing dependence on petroleum, the traffic sector plays a rather subordinate role although in 1980, with 58.6 million tons hard coal units (SKE), it accounted for more than 22 percent of final energy consumption and about two-fifths of all petroleum final consumption in the FRG, respectively. Up to about two-thirds of this was personal traffic with automobiles (including station wagons), which in terms of its magnitude corresponded to petroleum consumption in the household sector. Thus, for example, the question is to be examined here as to which substitution effects might be achieved with the use of electric automobiles in personal traffic in the FRG.

Advantages of the Electric Automobile


Against the background of the energy and environmental policy situation in the FRG, which is viewed as problematic, basically the following arguments speak in favor of using the electric automobile:

--decreased dependence on petroleum by the German economy through the use of electric energy on the basis of other energy sources;

--under city traffic conditions higher degree of utilization of the final energy used which in the case of electric vehicles is 50 percent in contrast to 10 percent for conventional vehicles;

--the clear superiority of the electric drive in utilization of useful energy--based on the primary energy used--in contrast to coal-based fuel alternatives, of course with an overall degree of utilization which corresponds to that of petroleum gasoline (Graph 1);

--lower pollution of the environment, under certain circumstances, in the form of noise and pollutant emission since the exhaust gases which accumulate in concentrated form in the production of electricity in the power plant can be more easily reduced to a minimum with technical means.



Graph 1. Use of Primary Energy by Road Vehicles in City Traffic

Key:

1. Primary Energy at the Place of Production = 100 percent
2. Year
3. Kind of energy
4. Primary
5. Secondary
6. Losses
7. Production
8. Distribution
9. Storage
10. Drive
11. Useful energy
12. Petroleum
13. Gasoline
14. Various
15. Electricity
16. From 1985 on
17. Various
18. Electricity
19. From 1990 on
20. Brown coal
21. Hard coal
22. Methanol
23. Synthetic gasoline
24. Synthetic diesel
25. Hydrogen
26. From 2000 on
27. Source: H. G. Mueller, "Electric Traction Without Bus Wire, Possibilities and Limits of Electric Road Traffic" in RWE INFORMIERT, Vol 162, Special Reprint from ZEV-GLASERS ANNALEN, Vol 104, No 1, 1980.

However, these obvious advantages of the electric automobile are offset by a number of obstacles which have a decisively adverse effect on the spread of the electric automobile as a substitute for the conventional automobile.

Limitations on Use of Electric Automobiles

At present only the lead battery is commercially available for drive purposes in motorized personal traffic. Nonetheless, this energy storage unit has only a very low efficiency which limits to about 40 km the greatest possible single driving segment of the electric automobile, that is, the distance it can travel without intermediate charging or a battery change. Under these conditions the use of road vehicles driven by electric battery is at present exclusively limited to local traffic.

This limitation permits use of electric automobiles by private households, which are the focus here, as a rule only as an additional vehicle (second car) which in combination with other transport means suited for long-distance traffic permit maintaining the usual model of mobility.¹

To the extent the infrastructure necessary for electric vehicles² is expanded and thus down times of the electric automobiles can be utilized for recharging the battery, the maximum single driving segment limitation does lose some of its importance. According to vehicle type, then, a daily distance of 100 to 200 km would be achievable. This is substantially more than the typical daily driving program of road vehicles in local traffic (less than 50 km).

Substantially more favorable conditions for a greater spread of the electric automobile even in long-distance traffic could be created by the development of higher performance batteries which would be ready for series production, then single driving segments up to 250 km would be achievable, as would maximum speeds up to 130 km/hr and recharging periods of only 90 minutes with fast charging. With certain high energy batteries there could even be a price advantage in respect to traditional lead batteries.³

Since it is still very uncertain when series production of high energy batteries is likely, deliberations on replacing petroleum by electric automobiles can, for the present, be based only on the use of lead batteries.⁴

However, the decisive obstacle to market acceptance of the electric automobile might well rest less in the limited use possibilities as in its deficient economy. The electric automobile is not only substantially more costly to purchase than a comparable conventional automobile with a combustion engine, but as a second car it must also be able to compete in many cases even with ordinary used cars. Neither the anticipated lower maintenance and operating costs of the electric automobile nor the two-to-three-times-longer useful life of the electric engines would suffice at present to compensate for the cost disadvantages in acquiring it.⁵

Under these conditions the electric automobile can take on importance as an alternative to the conventional automobile only if for energy and/or environmental policy reasons its spread would be aggressively promoted by in part

extensive state support measures. In the following the energy economy effects of a fleet of electric automobiles of 1 and 2 million units, respectively, are to be more closely examined. This fleet does not represent any forecast of plausible future developments, but can only be taken as a working hypothesis.

Potential of Substituting Electricity for Fuels in Personal Traffic

The following considerations and calculations are limited to estimating a petroleum substitution potential which could result in replacing combustion engine automobiles by electric automobiles in local traffic. The basic data here for the automobile fleet, the drive capability and the energy consumption are based on the one hand on the personal traffic forecast by the DIW [German Institute for Economic Research] for the year 2000 (Table 1)⁶ and, on the other hand, on data from the Society for Electric Road Traffic, Ltd (GES), Essen.

The DIW forecast is a "status-quo forecast" in which no quantitatively significant administrative measures to restrict personal traffic and no support measures for public street transportation, which go beyond the current level to any extent worth mentioning, are assumed.

The proportion of local traffic (up to 50 km driving distance) in the total drive capability of the automobile will decline, according to the DIW forecast, from 78 percent in 1975 to 66 percent in 2000. In absolute terms, of course, the total drive capability in local traffic will rise.

Further it is anticipated that the specific gasoline consumption of the automobile with a gasoline engine in local traffic will be reduced in the periods 1975 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000, respectively, by 12 percent each; in this connection, in addition to technically conditioned changes in the automobile fleet structure, the following assumptions were also made: increasing individual changes in behavior in the direction of a more efficient operation and better control of innercity local traffic at rush hours on the basis of changes in the structure of the reasons for driving. For automobiles with a diesel engine the reduction in specific fuel consumption in local traffic was set at 6 percent in each case, thus taking into consideration the level of technical possibilities for savings achieved.

Overall, a lower limit, which is considered technically achievable today, might well be defined by the saving which is estimated here in the average consumption of carburetor and diesel fuels for the years 1990 and 2000.

The assumptions for the electric automobile which are the basis of the determination of the petroleum substitution potential are summarized in Table 2. On the basis of the deliberations by GES a fleet of 1 million electric automobiles is hypothetically assumed for 1990 and 2 million for 2000. Such a fleet of electric automobiles--in any case more than one-fifth and almost two-fifths, respectively, of the anticipated second-car inventory for 1990 and 2000, respectively--might perhaps be realizable in this period only if there are extremely successful efforts both on the part of the vehicle

building industry and the administrative-political authorities (creation of the necessary infrastructure and financial incentives). The GES uses a specific consumption of 40 kWh/100 km as a basis. This specific energy consumption is accepted in the literature as a plausible pragmatic value, which in part is confirmed by test programs, for the use of lead batteries in electric automobiles.⁸

Deviating from the GES which assumes an average annual drive capability of 12,500 km in each case in local traffic (Case A), in a second try (Case B) an average drive capability in personal traffic of only 5,000 km was chosen for 1990. With this restriction, consideration is given to the inadequate infrastructure equipment for electric vehicles (power connections, recharging stations, accounting procedures, and similar things).

For the year 2000 in case B extensive elimination of these restrictions was also assumed so that then the general average drive capability of 8,200 km in local traffic could also be assumed for electric automobiles. The lower drive capability in local traffic (case B) is thus more plausible because the GES value of 12,500 km in each case seems to be extremely excessive in view of the annual average drive capability of automobiles in local and long-distance traffic of 12,800 km at present and because in the future we must figure on a further declining trend.

The demands on the future primary energy supply in respect to a changing structure of final energy consumption can be evaluated if the primary energy use, necessary for the substitution of petroleum products in road traffic, is taken into consideration in producing electricity. In this connection, on the basis of the conversion and distribution losses which occur in electricity production and distribution an average efficiency of about 33 percent of the primary energy used is assumed.

Supplying 1 million and 2 million electric automobiles, respectively, through the FRG's electricity industry--taken by itself--hardly involves additional power plant capacities and at most expansion of regionally limited power systems since mainly low-load periods come into question for recharging batteries. Moreover, since the electric automobile is a year-long consumer, it might even be possible to improve the utilization factor of the power plants.

With the expansion of night power⁹ storage heating, which was proposed in a study by the Power Plant Union Co for the period up to 2000, the night low in the power supply would, however, be fully utilized by electric heating up to an operationally meaningful level so that the electric automobile would have to compete with night power storage heating. These electric-industry considerations, however, will not be considered further here.

The hypothetical potential for petroleum substitution, the associated saving of final energy and the increased use of primary energy were calculated (Table 3) on the basis of the assumptions given (Tables 1 and 2).

It appears that the substitution potential for carburetor and diesel fuels in local traffic in the FRG ranges between 0.6 million to 1.4 million tons

SKE for the year 1990 and between 1.6 million to 2.5 million tons SKE for the year 2000, respectively, that is, 2 to 10 percent of the anticipated fuel consumption in automobile and station wagon local traffic could be replaced by using electrically-operated automobiles. This substitution would at the same time be linked with savings in final energy consumption. According to the calculations, the electric automobiles would be able to get along with about half the final energy consumption which would have to be estimated for conventional automobiles.

Yet if--in addition to the petroleum substitution being strived for--the primary energy use in the power plants necessary for this is considered, it is apparent that because of the low efficiency in electricity production and distribution an increased use of primary energy would have to be accepted. In 1990 it will be more than one-fifth higher than the necessary primary energy use for the production of substituted quantities of carburetor and diesel fuels, and in 2000 it will be just about two-fifths higher (Graph 2).

Summary

In the case of the specific consumption values assumed here the level of the fuel potential which is to be substituted basically varies with the average drive capability in local traffic which can be anticipated. Among the assumptions made, with the use of 1 million and 2 million electric automobiles, respectively, about 1 to 5 percent of the current total consumption of engine gasoline and diesel fuel in the FRG could be replaced. This petroleum substitution potential would meanwhile be offset by a significant increase in primary energy needs in order to make the substitute energy, electricity, available. As a result, the energy policy must balance the goals of energy saving and petroleum substitution with consideration of effects relevant to the environment.


The higher procurement costs, especially in the period of market introduction, and the lower use flexibility of the electric automobiles with lead batteries are the decisive obstacles to the spread of the electric automobile. Therefore, any acceleration in the use of the electric automobile, which is desired for energy and/or environmental policy reasons, would have to start here first. The conditions for that could be improved by concentrating the research funds planned for development of the electric automobile on the further development of battery technology--primarily in respect to lowering the weight and the manufacturing costs with an increase in useful life of the batteries--in such a way that the electric automobile is accepted by the market as a substitute for the combustion engine automobile and cost favorable series production can also be started for electric automobiles. Beyond that, the necessary infrastructure for large area use of the electric automobiles would have to be available in a timely manner since a signal function for potential interested parties is simultaneously linked with this and the energy policy intent is permanently manifested.

If even then the internal market forces should still be inadequate to get the restructuring process to the electric automobile in personal traffic into motion quickly enough, then some thought would have to be given to one-time

Abb. 2

**Substitution von Kraftstoffen
im Personennahverkehr mit PKW / Kombi
durch Elektro-PKW
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
für die Jahre 1990 und 2000**

(1) Primärenergieverbrauch der E-PKW
 (2) Mehrverbrauch an Primärenergie für E-PKW
 (3) Substitutionspotential von Kraftstoffen
 (4) Endenergieeinsparung durch E-PKW



(7) Quelle: Berechnungen des DIW.

DIW 82

Graph 2. Substitution of Fuels Used by Automobiles/Station Wagons in Local Passenger Traffic by Electric Automobiles in the FRG for the Years 1990 and 2000

Key:

1. Primary energy consumption of electric automobiles
2. Additional consumption of primary energy for electric automobiles
3. Substitution potential of fuels
4. Final energy saving by electric automobiles
5. Case A
6. Case B
7. Source: Calculations by the DIW

assistance in the procurement costs of the electric automobiles. In view of the funds which in the future, too, will be available in limited amounts in the public budgets for this sector of the energy policy and of the petroleum tax loss¹⁰ which is associated with this restructuring process in a not inconsiderable amount, to be sure probably only a subsidy, which is strictly limited in terms of time, for the pioneer function of first users would be justifiable.

Energy and/or environmental policy arguments for a spread of the electric automobile must, however, also let themselves be measured against whether through a partial shift of personal traffic in the local sector to public local passenger traffic and nonmotorized traffic, respectively, it might not be possible in regard to the substitution of petroleum products to develop a correspondingly large or even larger potential for lower economic costs.

FOOTNOTES

1. Of course, this restriction has only little relevance for the purely trade use of the automobile/station wagon in local traffic and for delivery vehicles in cities, especially for substantial segments in the state and municipal service sector.
2. Here the idea is mainly a system of low voltage charging outlets, for example in parking lots, on parking meters, in working areas of forwarding companies, in garages, and so forth. Given the presence of a built-in charging device a 200 volt/16 ampere outlet is as a rule adequate for recharging a traction battery, insofar as fast charge is not desired. One hour of recharging time would then permit about 10 km additional driving distance.
3. Compare "Opportunities for the Electric Automobile" in INTERNATIONALES ENERGIE-FORUM, May 1980, pp 31-32; also R. Metzler, "What Is the Situation With the Electric Automobile," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, No 207, 8 September 1980, p 28.
4. On 1 July 1981 in the FRG, including West Berlin, only 2,176 electric vehicles were registered, including 122 automobiles. By way of comparison the total number of motor vehicles in the FRG is 27,858,403. Compare STATISTISCHE MITTEILUNGEN DES KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMTES, No 11 and No 12, 1981.
5. Data from the GES show that at present electric vehicles, which were largely hand made for experimental purposes, cost about three to four times as much as comparable conventional vehicles with a combustion engine. Only when there is series production of at least 100 vehicles per day and type is a reduction to 10 to 20 percent in the added costs expected. In the Federal Government's report on promoting the use of electric vehicles, even with series production of 50,000 electric automobiles per year it is calculated that the purchase price (without traction battery) will still be roughly twice as high as that of an automobile with

a combustion engine. Even if the lower variable costs are included the total costs of the electric automobile with an average annual drive capability of 6,000 km and an annual production of 50,000 units are still one-third above those of the automobile with a combustion engine of corresponding size. Compare the "Report on Promoting the Use of Electric Vehicles," Bundestag Publication 9/165, 16 February 1981, p 9.

6. R. Hopf, H. Rieke and U. Voigt, "The Probable Development of Passenger Traffic in the FRG Up to 2000," WOCHENBERICHT DES DIW, No 34, 1980; R. Hopf, "Development of the Automobile Fleet in the FRG Up to the Year 2000," WOCHENBERICHT DES DIW, No 37, 1979.
7. Mainly the anticipated reduction in professional and training traffic will result in noticeable relief of the traffic routes at rush hours in innercity and local traffic, op. cit.
8. Without energy consumption for supplementary heating with fuel.
9. Compare "Possibilities and Limits of Oil Substitution by Electricity and Long-Distance Heat in the FRG," ed. Power Plant Union Co, Erlangen, 1980, p 28.
10. For the electric automobiles this does not take into consideration the inclusion of the road costs which are paid for in the case of traditional automobiles by the petroleum tax.

12124
CSO: 3103/390

BRIEFS

EXPORTS TO USSR--The Soviet Union will purchase 15,000 tons of dry red wine and about 1,500 tons of raisins. This action was received with relief by our wine producers and our farmers, because it solves a serious and acute problem which could have had very bad repercussions on our economy. It had proved problematic, if not impossible, to place our dry red wines. The price the Soviet Union offered for our wines is higher than that paid at present on the international market, including the U.S. market, which never evinced an interest in our product, and is not likely to do so in the future, if we are to judge from a statement made day before yesterday by the minister of trade and industry. As is known, the Soviet Union, on the basis of an agreement signed at the beginning of this year, has already purchased 350,000 cases of "moskhato" wine [sweet wine], 44,000 cases of Commandaria wine and 4,000 tons of alcohol. It is hoped that this friendly country will also buy the remaining quantities of wine and raisins, estimated at 5 to 7,000 and 2 to 3,000 tons respectively. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 14 Apr 82 p 1]

CSO: 4621/310

PAPER WARNS WAGE INCREASES HURTING COMPETITIVENESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Apr 82 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] It is a fact that wage increases in Denmark are now steeper than they are in a number of other countries with which Danish businesses must compete on the international markets. Government economists also estimate in the recently published semiannual economic review that the average annual wage of an LO [Federation of Trade Unions] worker will rise 11.5 percent between 1981 and 1982. It is estimated that hourly earnings for LO workers will rise 12.5 percent during 1982, which corresponds to the estimate the Economic Secretariat made public as early as last October. If there is to be a moderation of wage developments to bring them substantially in line with the government's action program on economic policy, cutting the anticipated wage increase tempo at least in half would be desirable.

Both the union movement and the employers are warning against intervention in wage developments. Both sides have agreed on the collective labor contracts for the current contract period and therefore wage developments should be allowed to progress without intervention. In that case there should be better chances that they could enter into new contracts in the spring of 1983 on their own, on a sound national economic basis, it is claimed.

The arguments do not appear to be directly convincing. Thus it is an open question whether or not the present contracts have led to any degree of wage development moderation. Even though large parts of the commitment paragraph have been suspended in 1981, this has not prevented a wage drift between the fourth quarter of 1980 and the same quarter in 1981 of around 3.5 percent. Now, as we mentioned, an even sharper wage drift is under way. For the entire 1981-83 contract period, it is hard to believe that wage increases will be much lower than those we have seen earlier.

Therefore it is hard to get away from the notion that an economic policy intended to maintain and improve competitiveness must contain an intervention in the automatic cost-of-living adjustment that this year is expected to release a total of four cost-of-living increments, corresponding to an hourly wage increase of close to 4 kroner.

It is obvious that there are other factors as well that have an influence on cost developments, but wage costs are the most important domestic factor and there is some chance that they can be influenced.

BRIEFS

FARM INCOME UP--Adjusted gross income for farmers rose 2.535 billion kroner from 1980 to 1981, from 14.826 to 17.361 billion kroner, corresponding to a 17 percent increase according to the Danish Bureau of Statistics. The increase occurred in spite of the fact that the numerical index for the sale of agricultural products was unchanged while the numerical index of farm purchases of raw and intermediate materials declined 2 percent from 1980 to 1981. Adjusted gross income is the amount available to pay for the total investment of labor and capital in the agricultural sector, including depreciation, interest payments on one's own and outside capital, wages for outside help and compensation for the farmer's own labor investment, etc. The total sales value rose solely as a result of price increases, rising 12 percent from 1980 to 1981, from 35.1 to 39.3 billion kroner, while expenses for the purchase of raw and intermediate materials and services rendered rose 14.5 percent from 19 to 21.7 billion kroner. Farm subsidies rose sharply. The general operating subsidy rose from 489 million kroner in 1980 to 728 million kroner in 1981. At the same time, taxes on production--primarily property taxes--declined from 1.212 billion to 954 million kroner. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 14 Apr 82 p 3] 6578

CSO: 3106/103

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS BANK LOANS--The European Investment Bank will grant Greece this year over 20 billion drachmas worth of loans for investment purposes. This was announced yesterday by the Ministry of Coordination, where the chairman of the European Investment Bank, Mr Le Porge [phonetic], signed yesterday afternoon 6 loan agreements for a total of 2.7 billion drachmas with the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, the National Bank of Greece and the Investment Bank. The loans will be used for investments in industry and agriculture. Mr Le Porge stated in a press conference that more agreements will be signed in the coming weeks for additional loans totaling approximately 5 billion drachmas. [Excerpt] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 14 Apr 82 p 1]

CSO: 4621/310

FAHRI BLASTS OZAL-BRAND OF BELT TIGHTENING

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 11 Mar 82 p 5

[Column by Mehmet Fahri: "We May Tighten Our Belts Forever!"]

[Text] When a country is going through a crisis, everybody, government and the governed, must carry the burden of the crisis; everybody must share the sacrifices necessary to overcome the crisis.

In such situations in our country, that is whenever there is an economic crisis--though we have not been without an economic crisis for the past 30 years--the people are asked to tighten their belts, and the people tighten their belts. But should not this belt tightening have an end and a result? Should not the so-called administrators tell the people that we will tighten our belts and make sacrifices for so long and that, at the end, we will achieve prosperity?

Our administrators have been doing that. That is, they have been saying that our economy will straighten itself after 3 to 5 years of belt tightening and sacrifices. This is something that all governments have said since at least 1950. But nothing has changed during all that time. Once again the people are being asked to tighten their belts. It seems that this nation is condemned to tighten its belts forever.

This being the case, it has become impossible to take this business of belt tightening seriously. Because despite all these years of belt tightening, there has been no substantive improvement in the situation of low and fixed income groups which have never been able to catch up with the prices. The low and fixed income individual seems, to a certain extent, to have lost his confidence in the government in the face of efforts that have all ended in fiasco. On the other hand, voluntary sacrifices on the part of the people are necessary for positive results. For voluntary sacrifices, the people must have faith that their problems will, one day, come to an end.

As we stated above, this has not been the case and the future does not seem to hold much promise either.

When the 24 January decisions were announced 2 years ago, the Honorable [Deputy Prime Minister Turgut] Ozal said that the economy would be restored to

health soon and that the people's sacrifices would come to an end. In fact, he said this would take 2 years. Later, this period was extended to 4 to 5 years. They may be right; we have no objections to that. After all, 4 to 5 years is not a long period of time in the lifetime of a nation.

Today no one knows when and where the daily price hikes and the domestic price pressures resulting from the effort to export almost the entire agricultural output will come to an end.

Although the Honorable Ozal has been frequently saying that inflation has been defeated and that price hikes have stopped, the latest developments fall far short of inspiring hope. In fact, these developments are cause for disappointment for the large low and fixed income group which has continued to tighten belts with the hope that its problems will, one day, come to end.

News reports that in the last 2 months prices have shot up by an amount they were supposed to cover in 4 months and that inflation may reach 58 percent by the end of the year belie the Honorable Ozal's words to the effect that inflation has been defeated.

Does not this mean that the people will be forced to tighten belts for another undetermined period of time?

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BRIEFING GIVEN ON EFFECTING BALANCED BUDGET

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Jan 82 p 1

[Article by Vecdi Sevig]

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA)--Economic balance in 1982 was stressed in the briefing given to the National Security Council [NSC] Budget and Planning Committee by the Finance Ministry and the State Planning Organization [SPO].

Speaking first at the briefing of the NSC Budget and Planning Committee, Finance Minister Kaya Erdem stated that the 1982 budget estimates were made on the basis of a 4.4 percent development rate and 25 percent inflation. Kaya Erdem said that the target for the state economic enterprises [SEE's] was that they become "self-sufficient."

SPO Undersecretary Yildirim Alpturk also noted in his explanation of general 1982 balances that importance was placed on the gradual reduction of the balance of payments deficit. Stating that the 1982 economic program had been prepared "by targeting the current status of our economy and foreign economic developments," he pointed out that the increases programmed for 1982 were 3 percent in fixed-price resources, 4.8 percent in fixed capital investments and 6 percent in public fixed capital investments. He said that estimated consumption increases were 4.2 percent overall, 8.1 percent in public consumption and 3.5 percent in private consumption. Alpturk pointed out that priority in the preparation of the 1982 investment program had gone to completion of existing investment starts and said that, for this reason, no new investments except very critical cases had been included in the program and that existing investments for which foreign resources could not be procured had been cut from the program.

Finance Ministry Undersecretary Ertugrul Kumcuglu then took over the technical briefing on the 1982 budget, explaining the reasons for the increase in current expenditures. Kumcuglu said that the 1982 budget personnel expenditure goals had been set on the assumption of a 25 percent increase in revenues. He added that budget revenue estimates were conservative.

The text submitted by the Finance Ministry at the briefing of the NSC Budget and Planning Committee notes that the public personnel wage and hiring policies which it had been decided should apply to 1982 were taken into account in setting current service appropriations in the 1982 draft budget, reading as follows:

"In setting 1982 current service appropriations, base prices in 1982 are taken into account in the goods and services which the priorities set in the annual program and the government programs must purchase to enable them to perform their services."

The Finance Ministry's briefing text points out that the 1982 general balances of the SEE's were set on the assumption of a 25 percent price increase in labor expenditures, foreign exchange rates, support prices and other input prices, then says:

"The basic for calculations is that hiring targets will retain the 1981 level in general and that the necessary rates of increase will occur in cases in which there is a question of new production and service units coming on line. As a result of macro economic growth, a total cost increase of 369.3 billion liras is projected in goods and services produced by the SEE's and the principle adopted is that this increase will be financed by passing it through to prices and tariffs. In addition, because of the need to adjust the prices and tariffs of some of the organizations upward of their cost increases, the total product increase is raised from 369.3 billion liras to 436.3 billion liras. Thus it is estimated that the profit of 62.7 billion liras within the organizations' 140.7 billion-lira operations deficits will rise another 67 billion liras to 129.7 billion liras and thus the operations deficits may be brought down to 73.7 billion liras."

Following the information related to SEE deficits in the Finance Ministry's briefing text, these views are expressed:

"Projecting the procurement of 56.6 billion liras of the resulting deficit from the Support and Price Stability Fund for fertilizer financing, it is estimated that the consolidated SEE operational deficit will be at the level of 17.1 billion liras. Together with the investment of 472 billion liras assigned to the organizations for 1982, their total financing requirement is 489.1 billion liras. Against this, after subtracting the total financing resources of 134.2 billion liras, consisting of 100.4 billion liras in foreign project credits and 33.8 billion liras which the State Investment Banks may provide to the organizations as derived from its own resources, we are still faced with a financing requirement of 354.9 billion liras which must come from the budget."

The text submitted by the Finance Ministry points out that the net financing requirement in the SEE financing derived on the basis of budget resources is reduced to 112.3 billion liras and the principle adopted is that this "will be covered by increased profitability, supplementary price and tariff adjustments and resupport of investment expenditures to the extent that these resources are exhausted."

It is stated in the Finance Ministry text that the "1982 budget contains conservative revenue estimates" and that it will also be seen that "the 1982 budget estimates of economic growth are realistic bearing in mind price increases and 1981 results."

FARALYALI ATTACKS 1982 BUDGET CONCEPT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 29 Jan 82 p 6

[Text] Izmir (CUMHURIYET AEGEAN BUREAU)--Ersin Faralyali, chairman of the executive board of the Aegean Chamber of Industry (EBSO), stated that the 1982 state budget was not sufficient to eliminate anxieties and imbalances. He also touched on the unemployment problem. "In a climate in which the number of business failures is steadily growing, measures must be taken at the national level to ensure, first of all, that such businesses make it through the crisis without closing down," he said.

EBSO Board Chairman Ersin Faralyali said in a statement before the Assembly yesterday that the basic causes of the money and credit shortage stifling the private sector lay in the excessive siphoning off of existing public sector fiscal resources and funds and in the transfer of these funds to the public sector. Noting that the abnormalities resulting from this situation were a serious threat to business, Faralyali said that the banks were the largest shareholders in business after the state. Asserting that this could not continue, Faralyali said:

"In Short, Turkey is living in a money market climate in which interest has been decontrolled but resources are seriously restricted by the state. In this situation, it is inevitable that credit interest will form at very high levels. For this reason, the only way out is to make the money and credit supply truly sufficient so that interest rates can come down."

Noting that the inflation seen in the past year was not demand inflation but cost inflation, Faralyali continued as follows, also touching on unemployment:

"When a country's production and investments are limited, it is probably impossible to prevent the spread of unemployment in that country. In order to solve both problems at once, measures are absolutely needed to increase the use of capacity in the private sector and to encourage investments. Even more important, in a climate in which the number of business failures is steadily growing, measures must be taken at the national level to ensure that such businesses make it through the crisis without closing down. Otherwise, there is a question of those who have jobs losing their jobs and joining the ranks of the unemployed.

"We would like to point out with sincerity that the 1982 state budget figures and the measures it envisages are not sufficient to eliminate the anxieties we expressed above and the imbalances which are growing to dangerous proportions. We contend that the economic stabilization measures are not wrong, but have not gone far enough, and do not contain measures to eliminate the imbalance between sectors."

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NEW DIRECTIVE TO BE ISSUED REGULATING MONEY MARKET, LENDING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 1 Feb 82 pp 1, 9

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Ankara--The capital market [law] goes into effect today. The law on the capital market, which according to one claim has been in existence for 20 years and according to another has just been instituted, was published several months ago to be effective 1 February 1982. The law envisages the formation of a "Capital Market Council" to regulate the capital market and take relevant decisions.

This council was formed in the past few days. Professor Dr Ismail Turk was appointed chairman of the Capital Market Council and we present here a conversation with him:

[Question] Mr Turk, where will you be working as the Capital Market Council?

[Answer] We do not have a place at the moment. Office space was allotted at the State Investment Bank and we are working here temporarily. A seven-member council is working here. However, some space was given at the assistance fund building of a bank of Mesrutiyet Avenue. We will move there in 3 months. It is a 6-story building with 1,080 square meters.

[Question] After the location problem, there is probably also a problem of staffing. Does Turkey have the expertise for so technical a matter as the capital market?

[Answer] The Finance Ministry will be our major source for staff procurement. But we are trying to draw on market organizations outside the Finance Ministry and on the universities.

[Question] The Capital Market Law goes into effect today. The law goes into effect, but is there a money market in Turkey for the law to regulate? Or not a capital market, but a money market?

[Answer] The Capital Market Law is both new and old for Turkey. The market itself appeared in the 1960's. The procedures go back to that date. That is, the market is old. But the law came later. The capital market has thriving organizations today. Developing countries have a savings deficit. Capital markets, therefore, develop in these countries.

[Question] Are your comments valid for Turkey?

[Answer] Turkey has the market and it is developing. It is not such as to say, if the capital market is developing, the problems are solved, but the proper conditions are being prepared by the law for such development, from the standpoint of evaluation of savings. This is the function of the capital market. If we can make the capital market safe and if we provide safeguards for the small saver by way of savings other than social security, there is no reason why such a market should not develop.

[Question] How is it possible to speak of development of the capital market in a country like Turkey when investments are retrogressive? Can the capital market thrive when investments are down?

[Answer] The lack of investments is something which stems from inflation in Turkey. Consumption rose, savings fell and investments lagged. But a stabilization program is now being applied. This is an anti-inflationary program. It is a policy to prevent savings from shifting to consumption. When we look at bank deposits, we see that the present figure has reached 1.2 trillion [liras]. And a large part of this is savings deposits. We might say that we are in a stage of transition from inflation to stabilization. Therefore, savings will increase this year. When they are turned into investments, investments will increase also. Then the capital market may find the climate needed for investment.

[Question] In other words, the conversion of savings into investment is a prerequisite for a thriving capital market?

[Answer] Yes. But there are also other conditions for the development of the capital market. In addition to savings and investment, there is the feeling of security to be instilled in savings holders.

[Question] At the moment, do you think savers have that feeling of safety? Especially with brokers going bankrupt one after the other?

[Answer] The feeling of safety requires a psychological climate. You mentioned brokerage. Brokerage was operating on shaky ground, far from an economic discipline. I do not want to go into how they were attracting resources, but they were using illegal practices. And therefore the liquidation of them by legal means has begun. Actually, the liquidation of the brokers is in the interest of the small saver. If the capital market boosts this interest, the market can be stimulated. The capital market is intended to create a strong middle class. Saving should be encouraged in order to accomplish this. Tax exemptions for instance.

[Question] Are you making any preparations for this kind of incentive?

[Answer] We will try to eliminate the drawbacks first.

[Question] Mr Turk, The Capital Market Law goes into effect today. But we also have Law No 2520 which changed lending procedures. Will both laws now apply at once?

[Answer] Law No 2520 will remain in effect.

[Question] But aren't there conflicting articles?

[Answer] One of the first tasks of our council is to address this. We will issue a covering communique.

[Question] What will the contents of this communique be?

[Answer] It will be a regulation to put in order the working conditions of the capital market in light of the various communique issued to date. There was decidedly a void in the period just past as to coordination of the communique issued to date. What is in the Capital Market Law, what does the lending law cover, these things will be clarified.

[Question] You are a council. What is the difference between your powers and the Finance Ministry and even the Central Bank?

[Answer] We are an independent council. The Finance Ministry is one that we are concerned with. But this is not to say that matters concerning the capital market are off limits to the Finance Ministry. We will work in coordination with the Finance Ministry. For example, oversight of the capital market comes under the Finance Ministry. Also we will try to fill personnel vacancies from there.

[Question] The existing agencies on the capital market are moving in a serious way towards the process of monopolization. What measures do you have in mind that would be able to prevent this?

[Answer] First of all we want the capital market to be functional. We are in favor of organization of the capital market. Then--as free enterprise is guaranteed by the constitution--whatever measures the government takes in other areas to prevent erosion of this right, it would take similar measures on the capital market also.

[Question] What sort of measures do you have in mind to stimulate the capital market?

[Answer] The law stipulates these measures. It is our job to put them in practice. For example, intermediaries will pay a risk premium of 1 mill. This is to cover risks. The United States has this system. There is an organization like an insurance company in America which covers the risks that investors in stocks and bonds might encounter. We will have a fund. But insurance companies will also be able to cover risks on the capital market in accordance with our commercial code. One of the most important measures to stimulate the capital market may be the reduction of risks or insurance to cover them.

[Question] Will the future fund be large enough to cover the actual risk that may come about on the capital market?

[Answer] It will have to be a technical operation. It depends on the volume of business on the capital market. As a rough estimate, I would say the annual business volume on the capital market is 100 billion liras. In that case, a 100-million lira risk fund will be formed through the deposit of the 1 mill risk premium and this will be a sufficient fund to cover the risk. The premiums paid are also eligible for deduction from corporation taxes according to the law.

[Question] Certificates of deposit are an important practice that will probably create problems in the future. How are these going to be handled in the banks' accounts?

[Answer] The banks keep certificates of deposit in a general account.

[Question] Certificate of deposit are traded. How much profit will there be on this trade, I wonder, and also how will the profit from this procedure be distributed?

[Answer] The latest communiques issued prohibit the trade in deposit certificates by brokers. Banks and brokers both had broken discipline, and trading was prohibited. This is all I can say on deposit certificates.

[Question] One last question, Mr Turk. You want to take steps to stimulate the capital market. But brokers are going bankrupt right and left right at this time. We mentioned this before, but how will this affect the other agencies, companies and even brokers in the economy?

[Answer] Liquidations certainly affect the economic agencies. Liquidation and shrinkage in the economy have negative effects on the economy. But elbow room also has positive effects on the economy and other agencies. We are going to swaddle a newborn now. Oversight will instruct it and guide it. 1982 will be the first year that the law will be in practice. So it is important. We will try to create a healthy and secure environment.

[Question] Thank you.

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MEASURES PROFFERED FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 29 Jan 82 p 7

[Article by Onder Girici, Vice President, Adana Farmers' Union: "Turkish Agriculture and a Policy"]

[Text] Agriculture certainly occupies the greatest position of importance in Turkish life. Just as this fact is expressed by everyone from the highest state official to the most powerful businessman, it is also recognized by the simplest citizen.

However, it is also a great truth that the greatest good is not gained from the products produced as the result of adequate assessment and management of Turkey's agricultural potential in keeping with these facts.

According to our view, in making the most of these facts, we believe it necessary to start from the beginning within an overall framework, not from the minutiae of the problem, and make a serious effort to take it through to a logical conclusion. Agricultural policy and the execution of it involves very extensive working units. Our view is that the agricultural working units are big fragments muddling through a maze of endeavors and out of touch with other. And this is the biggest negative factor in getting results. If we may give an example, there is a minimum of four ministries serving as competent ministries over Turkish agriculture. One may see in these services the fragmentation described above, organizations and services with duplicate functions even, but carried out in different ways. The handling of agricultural credits is an example. As is the implementation of production policy by one ministry and price policy by another. One may also see these conflicting and duplicated services among the general directorates of the same ministry. If we may state the problem more precisely, we are not getting profitable results because of fragmentation and duplication in agricultural services, a diminishing workforce and a rising financial scale.

After this brief evaluation, if agricultural production is to increase and services to become more effective, we think it necessary that a decisive, firm effort be launched to devise a Turkish Agricultural Policy along the lines of the views we present in the following paragraphs.

1. Long-term Measures

We would like to sum up in this way the matters whose consideration in this item is necessary: The agricultural potential which everyone knows we have, as we said in our opening statement, must be set forth in factual terms.

Climate, Soil and the water available for Irrigation, the principal elements of Turkish agriculture, must be determined region by region.

2. Intermediate Measures

The drafting of agricultural production policy and plans based on realistic determination of the principal elements of agricultural production in item 1.

Long-term determination of the goods and products destined for export and the status of internal consumption and plans for implementation must be included in this plan.

2 (a). Improvement domestically of high-yield varieties appropriate to the standards of seed, nursery stock and livestock breeding--the principal materiel of agricultural production--at a level appropriate to world conditions.

2 (b). Promotion of local production of chemical fertilizers--another element of agricultural production--to reduce external dependence and provisions for its conveyance cheaply and in abundance to the producer in time for use.

2 (c). Increasing the potential irrigation water used in agriculture and arranging for the producer to be informed in the techniques of its use.

2 (d). Taking up seriously and without delay the investments appropriate to the storage, stocking and cold storage of products produced.

2 (e). Taking the constructive measures needed immediately for investment in the packaging industry--an element which ensures higher market value and easier transport of agricultural produce.

2 (f). Arranging transport to ensure to arrival of agricultural produce at foreign and domestic markets in orderly fashion and good condition.

2 (g). Setting up serious organizations to ensure the procurement and continuity of markets in which all these efforts will culminate.

3. Short-Term Measures

In order that the existing system may function productively insofar as the efforts and arrangements expressed in the preceding two items achieve results, we consider it basic that the producer have the necessary facilities and resources to enable him to obtain in sufficient quantities and on time the best quality at the lowest price of the elements which may be called agricultural inputs, such as seed, fertilizer and pesticides. The farmer must be able to obtain credits easily and within the framework of arrangements appropriate to current conditions. Facilities must be provided for obtaining high quality seed and breeding stock from abroad until our own are sufficiently

improved. The planting of second crops should be encouraged, especially along the Mediterranean Coastal belt, and pricing policy on the crops produced must be equally as encouraging as on other products.

Products which easily find markets at home and abroad must be stressed.

In conclusion, we may say that there are without doubt efforts and plans in connection with the agricultural production discussed in the preceding three major items. However, as we also made clear above, because they are fragmented and dispersed among different ministries and organizations, a collective and orderly agricultural policy cannot be framed in a clear and comprehensible fashion. It is summed up in wheat, which enjoys the greatest potential, when one sector says, "We will export," while another sector opts for importation. Also, while it is claimed that [Turkey] is among the agriculturally self-sufficient countries, it is also true that it occasionally has to import agricultural goods and products.

We contend that while Turkish agriculture has the production potential, beyond our own nation's consumption, to be equally as strong in agricultural exports as the oil-producing nations are in oil, it is in fact entrenched in a conflicting production system such as we described in a few brief paragraphs. It is a must, therefore, that Turkish agriculture be given direction within the projections we have tried to frame in a very tight summary above. Otherwise, we feel, there will be no getting out of these conflicts.

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MUMCU EYES OZAL FREE-MARKET MENTALITY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 3 Mar 82 pp 1, 9

["Observation" column by Ugur Mumcu: "Not Liking Ozal"]

[Text] In an interview with EUROMONEY magazine, Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal has said: "I agree with many of [Milton] Friedman's ideas." Ozal has added that he has read Friedman's latest book. As reported by YANKI magazine, Ozal has said in this interview that the program he is implementing in Turkey is planned and "Ataturkist."

It is natural that Ozal is influenced by Professor Friedman. One would like to say: "I wish Ozal, an electrical engineer by profession, were inspired by liberal economists and thinkers as well as that today we would not have the interest rate disaster."

That is right: other options are available in a capitalist system. Putting aside the argument about systems, it is a fact that in a transition "from a planned economy to a free-market economy" certain day-to-day measures are necessary. Electrical Engineer Ozal has not thought, or has not been able to think, about these measures. The bankruptcies of the brokers directly imply the bankruptcy of the 24 January [1980] decisions. The bankruptcies of the brokers were the inevitable result of the absence of measures which should have been taken for the transition period. Who can say "no" to this assertion?

Let us put these arguments aside for now.

Today, can a statesman or a faculty member say "I like Marx's ideas" as Ozal likes Friedman's ideas? What happens if he says that?

If Marx's ideas are "foreign ideology," are those of Friedman 100 percent locally produced? One is as "foreign" as the other is. How credible can embracing one of them be while rejecting the other as "foreign ideology"?

If "Marxism means spying for the Soviets," then someone can come out and say: "Capitalism means being an agent for the United States." Are such arguments solutions to the problems?

Such arguments are nothing but crude demagogic and faulty thinking. The humanity of the 20th century has a right to benefit from any kind of thought no matter where that thought has originated from or where it is rooted in. Thoughts left as a legacy to humanity are reflected in and shape the policies of nations' governments.

At a time when a new constitution is being prepared, should we not raise this question in connection with constitutional law as well? Are not the constitutions we take as examples those in effect in Western democracies? Can we call these constitutions "foreign rooted" just because they are geographically rooted abroad? No we cannot do that.

Every country takes thoughts, constitutions and economic systems inherited by humanity and tries to adapt them to its national conditions. In this time and age, what does it mean and who can benefit from tacking "spying tales" onto economic systems?

If a government, as an entity, can stand at equal distance from those who agree with Friedman and those who like Marx, then we can say that there is democracy, tolerance and "impartiality" in that country. What can we say if that is not the case?

As individuals and as parties we may not be able to exhibit such impartiality. But if the constitutional structure of this country is not built on the basis of such impartiality, then we will never have the "Western" state structure appropriate for the 20th century.

As for Ozal's Ataturkism...

One is left speechless in the face of Ozal's contention that his economic policy is Ataturkist. Ozal may have the power to free interest rates, but he cannot change history.

Ataturk was a great man who embarked on the course of "planned etatism" by implementing the first five-year plan between 1933 and 1937 and who "nationalized" foreign capital. He was not an "advocate of foreign capital" as Ozal maintains.

Ozal may agree with many of Friedman's ideas. We respect that. But we do not like any of Ozal's ideas.

"The freedom of not liking Ozal and disapproving his policies" is not much to ask for. Liking Marx is prohibited, while liking Friedman is free!

Not liking Ozal must also be free.

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BAD CHECKS SEEN AS CRITICAL THREAT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Mar 82 p 6

[Report by Bilal Ozturk]

[Text] Istanbul--Ozer U. Ciler, the Director General of Istanbul Bankasi, said: "Bad checks have played a major role in the bankruptcies of many companies and brokers." Nuh Kusculu, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, said: "The problem of bad checks may hurt our economy the way the incident of brokers did." Professor Akin Ilkin, Director of the Banking Institute of the Istanbul University School of Economics, said that the practice of accepting postdated checks must be ended.

Ozer Ciller was asked by the UBA correspondent: "What is the effect of bad checks on the bankruptcies of companies and brokers and the economy of the country? Why are bad checks being written and how can they be prevented?"

Noting that it is easier to write a bad check than to forge title deeds, Ciller said:

"Bad checks have played a major role in the recent bankruptcies of many companies and brokers. These organizations had cash flow problems when they could not cash their checks on time and consequently went bankrupt. The use and circulation of postdated checks as promissory notes is very dangerous. This practice must be stopped by a decree. Furthermore, penalties against those who write bad checks in our country are inadequate. These penalties must be changed and made more severe."

Nuh Kusculu's Statement

Speaking for the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Chairman Nuh Kusculu maintained that the problem of bad checks is the result of the stagnation in the economy. Kusculu added:

"It is a fact that lately there has been a significant increase in the number of postdated checks which are circulated in the market and which are exempt from stamp duty. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce previously conveyed its views on this issue to the authorities concerned. We want two things from our government in order to protect our well-intentioned firms and companies

from such acts with ulterior motives. Firstly, we want prison terms against writers of bad checks to be raised from 1 week to 1 month to provide some deterrence and, secondly, we want the processing of promissory notes about which complaints have been filed to be expedited. We hope that the authorities will find a solution to this problem before we have incidents that may damage the economy of the country. Otherwise, a proliferation of bad checks and unpaid promissory notes will, as in the case of the broker incidents, affect a major portion of the population and damage our economy."

Professor Akin Ilkin

Replying to the UBA correspondent's questions on the issue, Professor Akin Ilkin said that the problem of bad checks stems from two factors:

"Firstly, checks may bounce as a result of mistakes made in accounting procedures. There is no ill intent in such cases. Secondly, we have the problem of deliberately written bad checks. This is an important issue for our economy. Authorities must take very serious measures on this issue. Deliberately written bad checks are mostly postdated checks. Also, as a result of irregularities in the flow of funds in some companies, their postdated checks are returned for insufficiency of funds when they come up for payment. The practice of accepting postdated checks at a time when money is tight is, naturally, incorrect. In my opinion, this practice must be ended."

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JORGENSEN'S CABINET TORN BY INTERNAL STRIFE, CONFUSION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Apr 82 Sec II pp 1, 2

[Text] Why is Defense Minister Poul Sogaard the one who has the last word at cabinet meetings--that is, when he has something to say?

Is Ritt Bjerregaard's departure from the cabinet the reason why no one hears anything any more about her coffee club member, Fisheries Minister Karl Hjortnaes?

Is Karl Hjortnaes keeping quiet because otherwise Housing Minister Erling Olsen is in the habit of denying everything he says?

Are Ivar Norgaard and Mogens Lykketoft planning to take the interest deduction away from homeowners and tax interest income earned by pension funds in revenge for the fact that Erling Olsen gained passage for his index loan?

Did J. K. Hansen become transportation minister just because they wanted someone else to become group chairman of the Social Democratic Folketing group?

Did the prime minister try unsuccessfully to reserve the post of finance minister for Ivar Norgaard, after which Knud Heinesen was forced to return to his old job?

Did Lise Ostergaard go along with having everyone in the cabinet wait anxiously to see who would be her successor or did they just gang up on her?

Was it Dorte Bennedsen who forgot all sisterly solidarity and made sure that Lise Ostergaard was removed from the job as building owner of the Royal Theater or was it Erling Olsen who was really behind that?

Does Energy Minister Poul Nielson sit securely in his seat at ministerial meetings because Anker Jorgensen backs him up, while sparks fly every time he makes a move outside?

This is the story of the Social Democratic minority government that came to power despite the wishes of the prime minister himself following the election

on 8 December of last year. SF [Socialist People's Party] chairman Gert Petersen has said of this government that it misunderstood something when it was advised to use shifting majorities. This referred to shifting majorities in Folketing, not in the cabinet.

The prime minister hates public disputes with ministers and if there are internal conflicts, he usually sends his finance minister to town in order to solve the problems. When decisions must be made, he requests clear brief reports from the ministers concerned, but he does not go out of his way to make known his own views about the areas assigned to various ministers before they manage to get their feet on the ground.

Inner Circle

The usual inner circle around the prime minister is made up of Finance Minister Knud Heinesen and Economic Affairs Minister Ivar Norgaard. The group is supplemented by Social Democratic group chairman Ritt Bjerregaard. Here thumbs are turned up or down on the projects of individual ministers. There is not much regular social contact either in the inner circle or in the cabinet. The prime minister does not ask cabinet members to be his regular private dinner guests.

Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen has a big problem. It consists of a prime minister who loves to intervene in foreign policy matters. When Anker Jorgensen is away, Kjeld Olesen leads government meetings, but both he and the Foreign Ministry wait anxiously for reports from abroad. On the other hand, Kjeld Olesen now feels quite confident about Defense Minister Poul Sogaard. He is kept on a very short leash by the foreign minister when it comes to NATO questions.

Until a short time ago, Kjeld Olesen resembled a Social Democratic crown prince on a pension. His public debate against the new candidate, Ritt Bjerregaard, on the fundamental ideology of the Social Democrats changed that impression. But he is still too deeply involved with his ministry to decide whether or not to fight for the post again.

In his own words, Finance Minister Knud Heinesen would have concentrated on "laughing, singing and picking apples" if things had gone the way he wanted them to when he left the post of finance minister at one time. But things went the way Anker Jorgensen wanted them to and he is again in the position of a Uriah, for which he is respected but not very popular among the other ministers. The post of group chairman would have had more attraction for Knud Heinesen, but since the post of finance minister could not be sold to Ivar Norgaard and a respectable place had to be found for Ritt Bjerregaard, Heinesen had to bite the bullet.

When the individual ministers have problems with each other, Knud Heinesen sets his "intelligence service" in motion and the circle around the prime minister makes decisions. When the ministers have problems reaching compromises with other parties, Knud Heinesen is recalled to tie up the agreements.

Problem Creator

Ivar Norgaard is one of Heinesen's big problems. He is quite an individual--too much of one, some people say. Ivar Norgaard views his cocky younger colleagues in the government with indulgence and sarcasm. It may have been precisely that sense of humor that led him to turn down the post of finance minister.

Norgaard has a habit of pursuing his objectives in many different ways, but he never gives up. A good example is his relations with Housing Minister Erling Olsen. A few years ago, Norgaard rejected Olsen's proposal on index bonds for tax reasons and Olsen would have preferred to do without Norgaard's ideas on taxing the tax-free institutions out of consideration for the sale of the index bonds. Now Olsen has his index bonds and this hardly went through before Norgaard started talking about taxing the tax-free institutions.

Collector of Reprimands

There is no question that Housing Minister Erling Olsen holds the record of the minister with the most reprimands from the prime minister. He has been willing to sacrifice everything--including a tax minister named Karl Hjortnaes--in order to build a few more houses. The first one to predict that Erling Olsen would become a minister was a Liberal--some say it influenced him later on. Former Tax Minister Karl Hjortnaes had his tax reform scuttled by a telephone interview with the housing minister that was aired on the radio news program.

Erling Olsen was reprimanded, but Karl Hjortnaes became minister of fisheries. Erling Olsen is popular in the government for his expansive sense of humor--also at his own expense--but no one has heard much about Hjortnaes since he became fisheries minister. In the past it was former Social Affairs Minister Ritt Bjerregaard who helped keep Hjortnaes' spirits up when he was swamped by the waves of public opinion, but now there are no waves and no Ritt Bjerregaard either.

Team Players

Mogens Lykketoft took over as tax minister and for the first time in many Anker Jorgensen governments, the prime minister has not had big political problems with his tax minister. Knud Heinesen and Mogens Lykketoft work very well together on economic policy--the team spirit dates back to Heinesen's period as group chairman and Lykketoft's as section chief for the Labor Movement's Business Council. Lykketoft even has good relations with Housing Minister Erling Olsen. He is respected by his ministerial colleagues even though some have a hard time following his complex theories and the prime minister is very happy to allow Lykketoft to answer tax questions at press conferences.

Behind the Door

Agricultural Minister Bjorn Westh has been up against it in dealing with the strong economic ministers in the government in connection with the agricultural negotiations. Mogens Lykketoft is Bjorn Westh's tax adviser for the time being and is leading him back on the right track if the former member the Liberal Center should come up with the wrong idea. Recently when Westh was asked by the prime minister to appear on TV, Erling Olsen hid behind the door in order to help Westh if he had trouble presenting his arguments.

Bjorn Westh is a member of a coffee club that includes Erling Olsen and Transportation Minister J. K. Hansen. The president of the club is no less than Energy Minister Poul Nielson. To use one of his own favorite expressions, Poul Nielson is "on the fringes" in the government context. The prime minister seems well satisfied with him, but others in the government have given up trying to tell the busy energy minister how to avoid having to constantly "muscle through" his energy policy--to use another of his own expressions.

Nice Major

Nice J. K. Hansen, a former major in the Defense Supply and Secretariat Corps who served as paymaster at Sonderborg barracks, was to the surprise of everyone--including himself--first elevated to group chairman and then to minister. Many think he became a minister because they needed to place the strong Ritt Bjerregaard in the group chairmanship--and lacked an obvious candidate for the Transportation Ministry. No one envied him the post after the P & T [Postal and Telegraphic Service] problems and apparently J. K. Hansen's one ambition is to do a good job administering his sector, without any problems with the accounts. This does not lead to a lot of attention being paid to his work and when some skyjackers came close to landing in Copenhagen a few weeks ago, no one remembered to inform J. K. Hansen even though as transportation minister, he would have been the one to issue the formal landing permit.

High Regard

J. K. Hansen spent that day pottering around his garden while Justice Minister Ole Espersen, who certainly has a better eye on where the spotlight is, was flown in on an express flight from Bornholm as leader of the government's crisis staff. Ole Espersen is held in high regard by the head of the government because he has not given him any problems yet. He even came through the house seizures without too much noise, doing so in his own way by giving all sides his complete and wholehearted backing.

His predecessor in the post did not always have the same elegant manner. Henning Rasmussen had a brief career as dual minister and chose the Internal Affairs Ministry. The temperance minister has a hard time getting support for his cause from others in the government besides the prime minister, but

he has given Anker Jorgensen a lot of problems in relation to the Social Democratic Folketing group. When Henning Rasmussen agreed to become minister the second time around, he thought he was on a safe route toward becoming prime minister. But the route became extremely long for the minister with the moulded shoes and the brown-striped suit. He is not the brightest star in the government.

Tall Dancer

Tall Svend Auken who loves to dance uses every opportunity to step on the toes of Education Minister Dorte Bennedsen. Not on the marble floors of a disco but at press conferences. The labor minister dominates when it comes to fighting youthful unemployment. The labor minister has had a hard time in the government as the minister presiding over the high level of unemployment and the problems have been so great that he wanted another post. But Anker Jorgensen is quite satisfied with him where he is. Svend Auken is popular in the government. Only one problem irritates everyone. He always arrives at meetings late.

Industrial Affairs Minister Erling Jensen is just as popular as Svend Auken. He livens up cabinet meetings when they start being too long or boring. Only B & W [Burmeister & Wain Company] managed to wrinkle Erling Jensen's brow at one time. Otherwise he is the man to postpone, cool down or ward off any problem within his area of expertise.

Poul Sogaard and Erik Holst have in common the fact that they both had to go through long faithful service in the Folketing group before they became ministers in contrast to the government's young group of ministers.

Poul Sogaard misses his old friends in the government, Poul Dalsager and Jorgen Peder Hansen. Only Erling Jensen is left of those the friendly DSB [Danish State Railways] man from Odense can really talk to. Sogaard is not enthusiastic about the young ministers--partly because he does not know them and partly because they are socialists. He is uncomfortable with them and they have caused him a lot of trouble in the Folketing group. Sogaard is a Social Democrat with a thoroughly middle-class attitude toward many things. When there are no defense problems, Sogaard seldom brings up topics to discuss at cabinet meetings. But when he does it can take weeks before the prime minister puts them on the agenda. Sogaard has had the experience of being given the floor 2 minutes before the prime minister goes out to brief the press. He puts up with it but he would like to return to his post in the Home Guard except that he fears Poul Nielson would get his seat in that case. And he could not bring himself to do that to his friends in the armed forces.

On His Own

Poul Sogaard has turned Christiania over to Erik Holst and so far things have gone peacefully for the environmental affairs minister. He sticks to his own

sector and not even an unsuccessful attempt to involve the director of Tivoli in the Christiania problem caused Holst problems in the government. Holst takes care of his own sector and stays far away from those of others, even though some feel he might have sent a copy of his letter to the Swedish ministers on Barseback to Poul Nielson.

The two female soloists in the government are diametrically opposed. Tove Lindbo Larsen leads a quite obscure existence as minister of church affairs and minister of Greenland affairs. The prime minister and the foreign minister have dealt with problems concerning Greenland and EC and the final decision on church subsidies is made by Knud Heinesen. But Lise Ostergaard, on the other hand, creates a stir with almost every step she takes.

Dear Lise

The minister of cultural affairs has had trouble in dealing successfully with any of her tasks. There have been problems with the plastic plant and the Hirschsprungske Collection. With film grants, the library law and now the construction on the Royal Theater. In a "Dear Lise" letter to the Finance Committee, the housing minister took away from her the building manager's position and after a sharp internal exchange he had to try to smooth this out again, an effort the Finance Committee ignored. When there are problems, the minister of cultural affairs runs to her prime minister, the man who appointed her to her first job as minister. Many people think the prime minister will get so tired of this at some point that he will find someone else, but for the time being she has survived both her own mistakes and the efforts of other ministers to ward them off.

Bent Hansen is a man no one in the government has anything bad or good to say about, not yet at any rate. All are waiting for him to settle into his ministry and for the time being he is being allowed to do so in peace. But a couple of ministers with good memories have not forgotten how during periods when there was bad blood between LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] and the government, he always sided with those who paid the bills for AKTUEL, namely LO. And they are waiting expectantly to see how he will administer the second phase of social income, which LO opposes.

This then is the account of Anker Jorgensen's fifth government. Will there also be a sixth edition? Or will he parachute to safety and leave the controls to a new man who like Anker Jorgensen himself has been dragged from the very last row? Will Jimmy Stahr get the post as minister of justice he wants so badly? Or will it be Helle Virkner as social affairs minister and Kristian Albertsen as minister of finances? What will Erling Jensen be next time? Not even Anker Jorgensen knows the answers.

6578

CSO: 3106/103

POLL ON PARTIES, COALITION, ELECTIONS IN HAMBURG, HESSE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Apr 82 pp 43-53

[SPIEGEL poll about the situation following the Lower Saxony elections and preceding the elections in Hamburg and Hesse: "'It Would Be Good for the SPD To Be in Opposition'"]

[Text] If it is a question of surviving the respective next elections as head of government,

--Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi (SPD) has a good chance,

--Hesse Minister-President Holger Boerner (also SPD) has a very small chance and

--Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has hardly any chance at all.

This is the judgment of 1,200 men and women--a sample of the 43 million adult FRG citizens--asked by the Emnid Institute in Bielefeld for their forecasts of the Landtag elections in Hamburg and in Hesse of 6 June and 26 September respectively. The third question was about who would win the Bundestag elections "if it were held next Sunday and if the SPD and FDP continued their partnership."

Every other person polled (52 percent) presumes that Dohnanyi will remain mayor in Hamburg. Only about every third person (36 percent) believes that Boerner will win the election in Hesse. And only every fourth person (26 percent) thinks that the SPD and FDP at present would still obtain a majority in Bundestag elections.

These questions and answers are part of a comprehensive examination of the political situation in the Federal Republic commissioned by DER SPIEGEL. Late in March, after the Lower Saxony elections, Emnid pollsters asked 33 questions about people's attitudes toward the parties and their leading candidates, about such explosive topics as the NATO double decision, the construction of nuclear power plants and the new measures taken by Bonn and the Laender of the FRG against foreigners and unemployed. Several questions asked at previous polls were repeated in order to establish opinion trends. (See graphs and tables)

Rarely have the views of many FRG citizens changed so fundamentally as in recent times. For instance, in the period of 1978 to 1982, a tolerant and friendly attitude of most Germans toward foreign workers has changed into a hostile attitude toward aliens. No longer a minority of 39 percent (as in 1978) but a majority of 68 percent toward the end of last month voiced its opposition to "foreign workers who want to remain here being allowed to stay here for good" and endorsed the demand that "they should go back to their country again."

And in an even shorter period, in the 1 and 1/2 years since the Bundestag elections in the fall of 1980, the SPD and, along with it, the SPD-FDP government in Bonn have dropped to an unprecedented low.

As yet this swing has had its effect only in the municipal elections in Schleswig-Holstein and in the Landtag elections in Lower Saxony. If, however, the present wishes and ideas brought out by Emnid in the SPIEGEL poll should be reflected in further election results and in changes in coalitions and governments, the Federal Republic will present a completely different political picture from the one in the late 1960's and in the 1970's.

According to popular opinion, the Bonn coalition of the SPD and FDP, now almost 13 years old, does not have a future any longer. This is shown by the Emnid poll in three ways:

1--A two-thirds majority of FRG citizens is convinced that the FDP will change partners, either before or immediately after the 1984 elections. Only a majority still thinks that there will be an SPD-FDP coalition after the 1984 election year.

2--Most FRG citizens in fact do not want such a coalition any longer. Emnid inquired not only about how the FDP was going to act but also about how those polled thought it should act. The result: A total of 61 percent would welcome it if the FDP sooner or later concluded a new alliance with the CDU/CSU (31 percent, if possible, before 1984; and 30 percent, if possible, by 1984). A mere 36 percent would like to see an SPD-FDP government after the 1984 elections as well.

3--Even if the FDP and the SPD wanted to continue to govern together, they probably would hardly be strong enough to do so. "If the Bundestag election were held next Sunday," they would attain only 43 percent.

The CDU/CSU at present would probably obtain an absolute majority--something it accomplished only once even during the time of Adenauer--and could relegate all the three other parties represented in the next Bundestag (SPD, FDP, Greens) to the opposition.

This makes clear the dilemma the FDP leadership has caused for itself. If it changes partners before the elections, it runs the risk of losing altogether too many supporters. If it waits until 1984, it runs the risk of no longer being needed by the CDU/CSU.

At present the Greens may be fairly certain of being able to take the 5-percent hurdle in a Bundestag election and in any Landtag election. Whereas as recently as 2 years ago the Greens' own hopes and their adversaries' expectations differed in regard to the Greens' electoral chances, today friend and foe are agreed that, at least for the near future, the Greens have established themselves as a fourth party.

While the Greens can look forward to any election, the SPD at present has to be afraid of any election.

At its peak, it furnished 6 of 11 Land heads of governments; Lower Saxony and Berlin having been lost, it now has only 4 left, and toward the end of this year, there may be only 2--Bremen (no election before 1983) and North Rhine-Westphalia (no election before 1985).

Though Dohnanyi has a better chance in the Hamburg elections in June than his opponent, Walther Leisler Kiep--not only according to popular opinion but also in the opinion of experts--the Social Democrat cannot be certain of victory by any means. Anyway, it is hardly likely that he will be able to show himself a brilliant victor. Unless the internal Hamburg polls of several institutes are mistaken, the SPD and the FDP (whose jump over the 5-percent hurdle will require some effort) either will barely manage or will just miss a majority. Then Dohnanyi would depend on the benevolence of those Greens of whom he said only recently that "they do not exist as far as I am concerned."

A change in government from Boerner to Dregger in September would have to be classified as an historical event regardless of whether one looks into the past or into the future. Apart from Bremen, Hesse is the only Land in which so far only Social Democrats have been heads of government. If red Hesse should turn black, the CDU/CSU Laender would receive a majority of 30 versus 11 votes in the Bundesrat [FRG upper house], and governing in Bonn would almost become a science of the impossible.

The fact that at present only about every third FRG citizen believes in a victory by Boerner in Hesse cannot be explained only with regional reasons--for instance, that Dregger's CDU attained 46 percent already 4 years ago, that the Wiesbaden head of government with his runway and nuclear power plant plans turned the Greens and many other leftists into mortal enemies of his and that during the very days when the Emnid pollsters were at work Hesse FDP chief Ekkehard Gries dissociated himself from his SPD coalition partner.

If Boerner fails in the elections in Hesse, he will be another victim of his party's nationwide malaise.

To what extent the climate has changed is shown particularly by the answers to the question about election chances ("Who do you think would win the Bundestag elections..."). It is asked regularly by all institutes with a view to making out any change in opinion at an early stage and in a reliable manner. In the last election years, the eventual victor had long since been established in the opinion of the people even when the replies to the so-called Sunday question ("Which party would you chose if the Bundestag

elections were to take place next Sunday?"') still made the race look like an open one.

In the election year of 1980 about two-thirds of FRG citizens were convinced from the start that the SPD-FDP coalition would win the election. Now it is the other way round. As many as 71 percent of Germans assign victory to the CDU/CSU opposition.

In other words, according to popular opinion, the SPD-FDP coalition at present has even fewer chances to win the election with Schmidt than the CDU/CSU had with Strauss in 1980. It can hardly get any worse.

Whatever other questions were asked, the answers consistently reflected the enormous difficulties of the SPD.

According to Emnid, at present only 67 of 100 FRG citizens who voted for the SPD in 1980 would now vote for it again. A total of 13 percent of the 1980 SPD voters have gone over to the CDU/CSU, and 7 percent each to the FDP and the Greens. (For comparison, the CDU/CSU has retained the support of 94 percent of its 1980 voters.)

Some comrades are consoling themselves with the fact that their party has lost so many supporters that the remainder are bound to be loyal voters whom it cannot lose in addition.

Yet even this hope is idle: two-thirds each of SPD and CDU/CSU supporters describe themselves as loyal voters, and not quite one-third "will switch occasionally."

If the degree of agreement with the party becomes the subject of inquiry, it turns out that the hard core of "convinced supporters" is smaller among the SPD than among the CDU/CSU--24 versus 34 percent. Among SPD voters 46 percent "largely agree" with their party "but differ with it in some points," and a further 28 percent, while "supporting the party's political views, dissent from it in many points."

The SPD's image has become substantially less clear. The view that it advocates the workers' interests to a greater degree than do other parties was held by 72 percent 4 years ago and by 63 percent 2 years ago, but only 52 percent of FRG citizens believe so at present.

In this respect, anyway, the SPD is still distinct from the other parties. But as regards the attitude toward the young generation, all differences have leveled off. A couple of years ago, according to an Emnid poll, 44 percent of those questioned thought that the SPD was the party which cared most for youth, with the CDU/CSU trailing at a great distance with 17 percent. In March 1982, on the other hand, the Greens, the SPD and the CDU/CSU were named with approximately the same frequency (24, 23 and 20 percent respectively).

In many people's view, the SPD has become a party of dissension. When Emnid asked a year ago whether the SPD was coping with internal differences of

opinion, 44 percent were optimistic, expressing the opinion that "by and large there will be agreement again in that party." At present only 28 percent think so. Conversely no longer 9 but 24 percent even believe that it will "come to a split of the SPD." About the same number (46 and 47 percent) selected the reply that "differences of opinion will persist."

The image presented by the SPD is pervasively somber; there are hardly any gray tones, let alone brighter colors. This became clearest when the Emnid pollsters read out eight critical opinions concerning the party, asking in each instance whether the opinion was "correct," whether there was "something to it" or whether it was "false."

Among other things, it was a question whether the distance between Schmidt and his party was increasing all the time, whether forces in the SPD wanted to loosen the Western alliance, whether the leftists had too great an influence, whether the SPD "bothers too much with fringe groups and too little with the bulk of its voters" and whether Schmidt "in some important respects is closer to the CDU/CSU than to the leftists in his own party."

Consistently only minorities of 8 to 24 percent contradicted the criticism, and consistently a majority agreed without or with reservations.

This is even true of the statement that "it would be good for the SPD to be in the opposition for some years." (A total of 48 percent said "Correct," 27 percent said "There is something to this," and 23 percent said "False.")

In this group of questions too it became clear what most FRG citizens consider to be one of the most important reasons for the decline of the SPD. One of the eight criticisms received greater assent than any others: 90 of 100 persons polled thought the SPD had "above all, suffered substantial losses of confidence among the young."

When the government is the subject of questions, the answers are hardly any more positive than when the subject is the SPD.

From April of the election year of 1980 to March 1982--in not quite 2 years--the number of Germans giving the government a grade of "poor" or "unsatisfactory" has tripled (from 13 to 42 percent). An average grade of 4.1, such as the government is receiving at present is not brought home by most FRG students in all of their 9 or 13 years of school. [1=excellent, 2=good, 3=satisfactory, 4=adequate, 5=poor, 6=unsatisfactory.]

Only a small minority of 19 percent assumes that an CDU/CSU government would do worse than the Schmidt government. Of 100 participants in the Emnid poll, 41 think that it would be as good or as bad as the SPD-FDP coalition, and 39 of 100 think it would do better.

It is a prevalent view of many psephologists, that as far back as during the time of Adenauer but also in recent years it was frequently the so-called chancellor bonus which decided the outcome of an election. What is meant is that the popularity of the respective Federal chancellor helped his party to get the final percentage points for a majority.

In the present malaise too SPD politicians are seeking consolation in scales ranging from +5 ("like a lot") to -5 ("do not like at all") used to measure the popularity of politicians and parties.

In fact the Emnid results show that Schmidt still is by far the most popular politician in Bonn and that he enjoys far greater support than his party. And SPD voters think more of Schmidt than CDU/CSU voters think of Kohl or FDP voters of Genscher.

But a comparison of current Schmidt data with previous ones shows that the popularity curve not only of the SPD and its chairman, Willy Brandt, but of the chancellor has dropped--in fact to about the same extent, only at a different level. As recently as 1980, the data established about the SPD were better than those concerning the CDU/CSU, but since that time the support for the SPD has decreased to such an extent that it now is no stronger than the dislike for it. The standing of the party is level.

SPD head Brandt in fact has become so unpopular that in his case--as in the case of CSU head Strauss--the score is negative.

Schmidt's losses in popularity also become obvious when his scores are compared with those of other politicians. The distance has lessened.

At the start of 1979, for instance, Schmidt had reached a high--2.8--such as no other politician had reached in years. His opponent, Kohl, had attained only a score of 0.9. The difference of 1.9 at that time--extraordinarily great--has now shrunk to a mere 0.8. While Kohl has not become any more popular despite his party's climb, Schmidt's score has dropped.

In addition to the data about parties and leading Bonn politicians gathered by Emnid, the institute came up with a score on the scale of support which cannot be to the liking of Schmidt any more than it can be to that of Kohl. Emnid asked about support for Lower Saxony Minister-President Ernst Albrecht of the CDU. He attained a score of 1.5 in the days following his electoral victory--only 0.1 worse than Schmidt and far better than Kohl.

Though the Albrecht score in all likelihood will change again as his days of glory pale, Schmidt henceforth cannot be sure that his popularity cannot be equaled or exceeded by other politicians in the foreseeable future, and Kohl cannot hope to become as popular as his competitors in future selections of a candidate for chancellor when they will be able to present themselves as election victors and heads of government.

Even if Schmidt could regain his former popularity, he would probably manage only to a limited extent to achieve a consensus between his party and its voters.

Regardless of whether it is a question of nuclear power, of missiles or of the peace movement, a large part or even a majority of SPD voters consistently holds views that differ from those at the top of the party.

For years now, a bare majority of FRG citizens and a large minority of them have, respectively, voiced their support of and opposition to the building of further nuclear power plants--at present 52 and 46 percent respectively.

As far as the CDU/CSU is concerned, these blocs of opinion opposing each other represent no problem. The party and most of its voters are for nuclear power. The SPD leadership, on the other hand, which likewise supports the building of further power plants, is confronted by a majority of opponents of nuclear power among its own voters.

The missile decision of NATO* will probably cause the SPD even greater difficulties than it has done so far.

The views of FRG citizens are polarizing increasingly. There has been a decrease in the past few months in the number of Germans who are indifferent toward the subject or who have not yet formed a definite opinion. There has been an increase both in the number of advocates and in the number of opponents.

The effect on the two big parties has varied. Among the CDU/CSU voters the number of advocates has increased, while among SPD voters the number of opponents has risen. In the meantime, however, the trend first has led to a situation where SPD voters are equally divided into advocates and opponents of the double decision.


Regarding the peace movement a contrast is apparent between the attitude of most SPD leaders, whose position ranges from critical to negative, and the attitude of SPD voters, whose stand is predominantly positive.

It appears paradoxical that among the few things on which party leaders and voters of the SPD agree is an opinion which really ought not to be found in a workers party bent on solidarity.

Even before the Federal Government, over the protest of the trade unions, decided that under certain conditions persons unemployed must also take jobs which do not accord with their qualifications and are remunerated less well, Emnid established that this innovation has the approval of a two-thirds majority not only of FRG citizens as a whole but also of SPD voters.


In a second and last report on the SPIEGEL poll, the question will be examined as to how stable the present voter potential of the parties is.

*Emnid explanation: "What is meant by the NATO double decision is that, on the one hand, NATO decided to station U.S. intermediate-range missiles in West Europe as of 1983 but, on the other hand, has proposed to the Soviet Union negotiations with a view to forgoing entirely or in part the stationing of these missiles in the event of an agreement."




Key to graph 1:

1. Is the Coalition Holding Up Or Breaking Up?
2. "Is the coalition between the SPD and the FDP going to hold up until 1984, or will it split before that time?" This was 1 of 33 questions used by the Emnid Institute of Bielefeld on behalf of DER SPIEGEL in late March to examine the political situation in the Federal Republic. Percentages of various types of persons polled were as follows:
3. All persons polled
4. CDU/CSU voters
5. SPD voters
6. FDP voters
7. Green voters
8. "Coalition will split before that time"




Key to graph 2:

1. What Does the FDP Want?
2. There was a choice of three questions when Emnid inquired about the likely future behavior of the FDP. The opinion of FDP voters differs from that of the other FRG citizens.
3. Replies were selected as follows:
4. "The FDP will end the coalition with the SPD before 1984 and form a new government with the CDU/CSU."
5. Percentage of FRG citizens overall
6. FDP voters
7. "The FDP will remain in coalition with the SPD until 1984 and then form a new government with the CDU/CSU."
8. "The FDP will continue its coalition with the SPD also after 1984."
9. Remaining percentage: "Do not know," no statement



Key to graph 3:

1. The following standard question was answered in the following percentages.
"If the Bundestag elections were to be held next Sunday, which party would you vote for?"
2. Majority for Opposition
3. Greens



Key to graph 4:

1. Foreign Workers, Go Home?
2. No longer a minority (like as recently as 2 years ago) but a two-thirds majority of FRG citizens believes that "foreign workers should go back to their country again." Percentages are as follows:
3. Voters of
4. FRG citizens overall
5. Greens
6. "Foreign workers who want to stay should be able to stay for good"
7. Percentages of those advocating the return of foreign workers to their homeland
8. December
9. March



Nato-Beschluß: (1)
mehr pro als contra

Sowohl von den CDU/CSU-Anhängern wie auch von den Anhängern der Grünen unterscheiden sich die SPD-Wähler, wenn nach dem Nato-Doppelbeschluß über Abrüstungsverhandlungen und Raketenstationierung gefragt wird. Die Antworten (in Prozent): (2)

Bundes- burger	Wähler der insge- samt	CDU CSU	SPD	FDP	Grünen	
40	53	30	31	14		
„Für den Nato-Doppelbeschluß“ (6)						
24	14	29	36	52		
„Dagegen“ (7)						
13	12	15	9	12		
„Ist mir gleichgültig“ (8)						
22	21	24	24	22		
„Noch keine feste Meinung“ (9)						

Key to graph 5:

1. NATO Decision: More For Than Against
2. SPD voters differ both from CDU/CSU supporters and from supporters of the Greens when asked about the NATO double decision concerning disarmament negotiations and the stationing of missiles. The replies (percentages):
3. FRG citizens overall
4. Voters of
5. Greens
6. "For the NATO double decision"
7. "Against"
8. "A matter of indifference to me"
9. "No firm opinion as yet"

Die Friedensbewegung hat unter den SPD-Wählern mehr Sympathien als unter den Unions-Wählern. Die Antworten auf die entsprechende Frage (in Prozent): (1)

Bundes- burger	Wähler der insge- samt	CDU CSU	SPD	FDP	Grünen	
33	45	24	21	15		
lehnen die Friedensbewegung ab oder äußern Bedenken (5)						
14	11	20	7	0		
ist die Friedensbewegung gleichgültig (6)						
44	41	45	69	40		
finden die Friedensbewegung gut. (7)						
werden sich aber nicht beteiligen (7)						
8	3	11	3	45		
sind oder werden „vielleicht“ oder „bestimmt“ aktiv (8)						

DER SPIEGEL


Key to graph 6:

1. The peace movement enjoys greater support among SPD voters than among CDU/CSU voters. The replies to the respective questions (in percentages):
2. FRG citizens overall
3. Voters of the
4. Greens
5. reject the peace movement or voice misgivings
6. are indifferent toward the peace movement
7. approve of the peace movement but will not participate
8. are, or "perhaps" or "certainly" will become, active

Häufigste Note: mangelhaft (1)


„Wie zufrieden oder unzufrieden sind Sie mit der jetzigen Regierung in Bonn? Bitte sagen

Sie es mit Schulnoten.“ Von je 100 Bundesbürgern entschieden sich für die Note (2)



Daß die Bundesbürger weit unzufriedener

ren Umfragen. Von je 100 Bundesbürgern entschieden sich (9)



DER SPIEGEL

Key to graph 7:

1. Most Frequent Grade: Poor
2. "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the present government in Bonn? Please say so in terms of school grades." Percentages of FRG citizens selecting the respective grades below:
3. "Satisfactory"
4. "Adequate"
5. "Poor"
6. "Good"
7. "Unsatisfactory"
8. "Very good"
9. The fact that FRG citizens are far more dissatisfied than they have been in the past is shown by a comparison of polls. Percentages of FRG citizens giving their opinions at the times indicated:
10. For the grades
11. March
12. or
13. Average grades


Sympathie für SPD auf Null (1)

Helmut Schmidt hat in den letzten Jahren an Populärheit erheblich verloren, aber er besitzt noch immer weit mehr Sympathien als seine


Partei und deren Vorsitzender Willy Brandt. Emnid ermittelte die Werte anhand einer so genannten Sympathieskala von + 5 bis - 5.

(2)

Es ergaben sich als Durchschnittswerte für (3)



Zum Vergleich die Werte für die anderen Parteien und deren Vorsitzende (März 1982): (5)



Auch unter SPD-Wählern ist Schmidt populärer als Brandt und als seine Partei. Gefragt wurde auch nach den Sympathien für den prominentesten SPD-Linken Erhard Eppler.


Im März 1982 ermittelte Werte: (8)

	SPD	Brandt	Schmidt	Eppler
(7)	+3.0	+1.8	+3.5	+0.1

HER SPIEGEL

Key to graph 8:

1. Support for SPD Is Level
2. While having considerably lost in popularity in the past few years, Helmut Schmidt still enjoys far greater support than does his party or its chairman, Willy Brandt. Emnid came up with its scores by using a so-called support scale from +5 to -5.
3. Average scores for:
4. March
5. For comparison, the scores for the other parties and their chairmen (March 1982):
6. Greens
7. Among SPD voters too, Schmidt is more popular than Brandt or his party. The pollsters also inquired about support for the most prominent SPD leftist, Erhard Eppler.




Key to graph 9:

1. Nuclear Power: SPD Voters Against It, FDP Voters For It
2. Do nuclear power plants have to be built "if we want to maintain our prosperity," or should no further plants be established "because the risks are too great"? Views differed depending on the person's politics.
3. Percentages of persons favoring the building of nuclear power plants:
4. FRG citizens overall
5. Voters
6. Greens

**Volksmeinung:
Dohnanyi siegt in Hamburg, Dregger in Hessen (1)**


Vier Emmid-Fragen galten den nächsten Landtagswahlen in Hamburg und Hessen.

Von je 100 Befragten erwarten „nach den Wahlen“ als Regierungschef (2)



Key to graph 10:

1. Popular Opinion: Dohnanyi Will Win in Hamburg, Dregger in Hesse
2. Four Emmid questions concerned to next Landtag elections in Hamburg and Hesse. Percentages of people expecting the persons shown to become head of government "after the elections":



Key to graph 11:

1. Here are the percentages of persons giving the replies indicated to the question as to whether the FDP and Greens will take the 5-percent hurdle and "manage to get into the Landtag in Hesse:
2. "FDP will manage"
3. "The Greens will manage"
4. "The FDP will not manage"
5. "The Greens will not manage"

8790

CSO: 3103/411

SORSA REJECTS CHANCE OF COOPERATION WITH CONSERVATIVES

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 Mar 82 p 11

[Article: "Sorsa Considers Government Cooperation To Be Theoretical 'Conservative Party Too Rightwing'"]

[Text] In theory the Conservative Party could assume the role of the Center Party in the government and enter into cooperation with the Social Democrats. However, at this time the party is too rightwing. This is the opinion of SDP Chairman, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa.

Conservative Party Vice Chairman Tapani Morttinen considered Sorsa's statement as playing the Conservative card. In Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen's opinion the government base should be expanded to the right.

Sorsa considers a government based on Conservative Party and SDP cooperation to be completely theoretical.

"Indeed, it is possible in theory. But this is only theory. The Conservative Party would have to change quite drastically, become more centrist," states Sorsa in an interview given to the News Center.

In the opinion of the prime minister the Conservative Party itself is not too enthusiastic about becoming more centrist.

"I consider Sorsa's statement as a playing of the Conservative card," states Conservative Party Vice Chairman Tapani Morttinen.

In Morttinen's opinion the participation of the Conservative Party in the government together or without the Center Party depends on the Center Party.

In his opinion Sorsa's statement does not contain anything new.

"This is that same kind of talk by which an attempt is made to divide the Conservative Party," he states.

Vayrynen Believes in SDP-Center Party Axis

Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen does not see any obstacles in principle to the participation of the Conservative Party in the government. He points out recent statements from leftwing circles in which the Conservative Party is considered to be suitable for court.

"We have always proposed that the government base should be expanded. However, Vayrynen does not consider it possible that the Conservative Party would assume the role of the Center Party in the government.

"We consider a government based on cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Center Party to be imperative."

Explanations of Reagan Statement

Sorsa evoked a flood of opinions when he stated in an interview given to SVENSKA DAGBLADET that detente and cooperation in international politics will not be promoted during Reagan's presidential term.

In the interview published on Saturday Sorsa did not consent to give a direct assessment of whether his stand means a change in Finland's previously adopted method of expressing opinions on the super powers. Vayrynen does not want to interpret the meaning of Sorsa's statement either, but Morttinen does.

"A rather inflammatory statement. It seems quite exceptional. This statement differs from previous statements and points more to a role of judge than physician," states Morttinen.

According to him these types of statements were not made during President Urho Kekkonen's term of office.

10576
CSO: 3107/102

OBSERVER LOOKS AT 'CRISIS SITUATION' IN COMMUNIST PARTY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Mar 82 p 2

[Commentary by Pentti Poukka]

[Text] "When winter has passed, it is too late to attempt to build a snow castle."

Finnish communism is in a crisis situation. This must be said even if I tried to make a favorable assessment. The Communists themselves have openly expressed their concern, and even though some of this concern is without a doubt an appeal on the part of comrades, concern for the party's future is real.

Since approximately 160,000 voters who previously voted for SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] candidates in the electoral elections now gave their votes to the Social Democrats, a dangerous side step became apparent. It in its own way is many times more dangerous than, for example, the so-called non-affiliated supporters of Koivisto who previously voted for the Conservative Party.

Self-Confidence Must Be Restored

The Finnish Communist Party has reacted with gratifying speed and has sounded the alarm. Haste was made to convene a special party conference in Tampere, at which 2,000 Communists are discussing the party's urgent issues.

The conference, which is meeting today and tomorrow, will make no decisions, but it will surely be an important meeting from the point of view of measuring opinions. But what is even more important is that in this view pressures can be relieved before the urgent extraordinary congress is held in May.

From the Communist press it is easy even for an outsider to follow the issues which now most disturb the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. The internal dissension of the party is uppermost and apparent everywhere, but it does not, however, carry much weight compared with the fact that ideologically the party is encountering an impasse.

First Secretary Arvo Aalto, whose political prestige seems to be on the rise in party circles, crystallized the SKP's basic problems in a recent speech: "The SKP must restore its self-confidence, confidence in the inevitability

of its existence, the authenticity of its obligations to effect social change, and in its ability to make a constructive contribution to the future of our nation from the premises of scientific socialism and in accordance with the interests of the vast majority of the people."

Winter Has Passed

When the first secretary of the Communist Party states that the party must restore its self-confidence in the inevitability of its existence and in the authenticity of its obligations, one must assume that the party has lost them. According to it the SKP does not now believe it is an indispensable factor in society. But in addition to this, the party itself does not believe in the authenticity of its obligations. It has lost its self-confidence and a sincere belief in social change on the basis of socialism.

Certain communist theoreticians note that not too much should be expected from the discussions concerning the party's policy line any more from the party conference being held now than from the extraordinary congress in May. The discussion is being conducted in a situation in which the party is suffering from a serious theoretical-ideological backwardness.

For my own part as an outside observer I fully concur with these concepts. The time in Finland has by-passed the Communist Party. Changes in the social environment have occurred at a rate faster than in the party's theoretical-ideological content. Now that winter has passed, it is too late to attempt to build a snow castle.

Flight From Communism

As an economically and socially highly developed country Finland has differed from other comparable countries, for example, in the fact that the demographic and economic structure was heavily weighted toward a rural and agricultural economy rather late in its development. Now that urbanization has begun since World War II, the change has been revolutionary and constituted a world record.

At this point the demographic and economic structure has for the most part "normalized". From this point of view Finland is no longer an exceptional European country.

The considerable support of the Communists and their satellites has been a conspicuous peculiarity in Finland's political structure. As is well known, in this respect we differ decisively from the other Nordic countries.

One should not, of course, resort to the development of an apparent comparison, but it is very tempting to entertain the idea that a revolutionary political structural change can also be expected in Finland, a flight from communism somewhat in the same manner as the flight that occurred from rural areas to the cities. In any event concern about an expected collapse and disagreement over the methods to prevent it may very well have been the uppermost cause of internal dissension in the Communist Party.

Joyful Heirs

Whatever happens, the Social Democrats are awaiting the commencement of the writing of a last will and testament as joyful heirs. The electoral elections and the selection of a president all came to them as a fortunate political accident, which violently gave impetus to otherwise expected development in one fell swoop.

It must only be a question of time before the Social Democrats in Finland also acquire a position as the major leftwing party similar to that in the other Nordic countries. This can be assumed.

However, the struggle against communism in Finland is not yet over. But in politics one must be able to look sufficiently far into the future. What is apparent is that in the future the political struggle in Finland will be waged between a social democratic welfare state concept and a politically directed economy, on the one hand, and a rightwing vision and a market economy policy, on the other hand.

However, this is only the tune of the future. The Communists are intact and do not intend to give up without a struggle. The SKP is still a considerable political factor, which must be given serious consideration.

10576
CSO: 3107/102

PAPER VIEWS WIDER ASPECTS OF MERGER OF LIBERALS WITH CENTER

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Mar 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Pressures For Change in Party System"]

[Text] It is characteristic for a political party system to move very slowly. The merger of the Liberal Peoples Party with the Center Party is thus an exceptionally violent example of a change which is, indeed, always in progress, but which rarely acquires such a visible form.

Usually, pressures for change are taken care of by changing the names of parties; the organization with its leadership positions is retained even if ideologies are altered. The last time this happened was when the Agrarian League changed its name to the Center Party and "urban thinking" was at least temporarily included in the party platform.

The effect of the move made by the Liberal Peoples Party on the future of the Center Party and the whole political center remains to be seen. Above all, it is impossible to predict the behaviour of Liberal voters in advance. However, it must be stated that this energetic decision of the LKP [Liberal Peoples Party] is a symptom of pressures for change in the whole political arena. Even other small parties living on the edge of their existence can in the near future also be faced with the same moment of truth: Whether to wither away slowly or to join some other larger party?

Of our ten or so parties the Constitutional Rightwing Party (POP) and the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) can in the near future or at a later time be faced with the same question. The protests of the 1960's and the 1970's have already been broken.

The structural change in rural society, which made the rise of the SMP in addition to the personality of Veikko Vennomo possible, is beginning to come to a conclusion. The change in the office of president, on the other hand, is reducing the motive for the existence of the POP and to a certain degree is even otherwise affecting the conditions of our party system. A better future can be predicted for the Christian League since the party has succeeded in overcoming its initial difficulties and injecting itself into society on the ideological as well as organizational level. However, the opportunities for the expansion of the SKL [Finnish Christian League] are still rather few.

The Swedish Peoples Party, for its part, is a lasting phenomenon -- or at least as lasting as the Swedish language in our country. Probably what will happen is that the disappearance of the Liberals will increase the influence of the RKP [Swedish Peoples Party] as the only actual liberal party in Finland.

The theory of the increasingly stronger position of the four large parties has turned out to be true. It is doubtful that the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party will be faced with any other essential difficulties than those arising from their size. Their paradoxical problem is to contend with an institutionalization resulting from an excessively large size. It is doubtful that the SDP and the Conservative Party will encounter ideological difficulties since the thinking of their constituencies favors broad-based parties. As surprising as it perhaps is, the stiffest competition for voters is being waged across this socialist-bourgeois line of demarcation.

The Center Party will receive from the Liberals a welcome injection, and even though this "LKP-addition" is not in the final count too significant, the Center Party will be able to use this card to its advantage until the parliamentary elections and even beyond them. The Center Party's position as a ruling party is certain, but its sphere of influence is much smaller.

The fourth "large party" or the Communist Party is on the decline, but will be able to activate its constituency better than before as a kind of leftwing alternative movement at the side of the SDP, which is becoming more bourgeois. The real news of the day is the movement of the LKP's "radical Liberals" even past the SDP in the direction of the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League]. The only thing that can be said about this is that the LKP's division has been indeed extensive. A leftwing nonsocialist party would indeed be an interesting phenomenon.

Finland after the presidential elections continues to be emphatically a multi-party country, in which the practice of politics is more than ever before in the hands of professionals as the influence of the dilettante-type small parties declines. A discussion of a rational social policy will be insignificant at least as long as the SDP is a ruling party and the Conservative Party is in opposition.

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